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"NO OTHER NAME"; A MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE EXCLUSIVITY 
OF SALVATION THROUGH CHRIST 
William Lane Craig 
The conviction ofthe New Testament writers was that there is no salvation apart from Jesus. 
This orthodox doctrine is widely rejected today because God's condemnation of persons in 
other world religions seems incompatihle with various attributes of God. 
Analysis reveals the real problem to involve certain counterfactuals of freedom, e.g., 
why did not God create a world in which all people would freely believe in Christ and be 
saved? Such questions presuppose that God possesses middle knowledge. But it can 
be shown that no inconsistency exists between God's having middle knowledge and 
certain persons' being damned; on the contrary it can be positively shown that these two 
notions are compatible. 
Introduction 
"There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given 
among men by which we must be saved" (Acts 4.12). So proclaimed the early 
preachers of the gospel of Christ. Indeed, this conviction permeates the New Testa-
ment and helped to spur the Gentile mission. Paul invites his Gentile converts to 
recall their pre-Christian days: "Remember that you were at that time separated 
from Christ, alienated from the commonwealth ofIsrael, and strangers to the cove-
nants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world" (Ephesians 2.] 2). 
The burden of the opening chapters of Romans is to show that this desolate situa-
tion is the general condition of mankind. Though God's eternal power and deity 
are evident through creation (1. 20) and the demands of His moral law implanted 
on the hearts of all persons (2.15) and although God offers eternal life to all who 
seek Him in well-doing (2.7), the tragic fact of the matter is that in general people 
suppress the truth in unrighteousness, ignoring the Creator (] .21) and flaunting 
the moral law (1.32). Therefore, "all men, both Jews and Greeks, are under the 
power of sin, as it is written: 'None is righteous, no, not one; no one understands, 
no one seeks for God'" (3.9-] I). Sin is the great leveler, rendering all needy of 
God's forgiveness and salvation. Given the universality of sin, all persons stand 
morally guilty and condemned before God, utterly incapable of redeeming them-
selves through righteous acts (3.19-20). But God in His grace has provided a 
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means of salvation from this state of condemnation: Jesus Christ, by his expiatory 
death, redeems us from sin and justifies us before God (3.21-26). It is through 
him and through him alone, then, that God's forgiveness is available (5.12-21). 
To reject Jesus Christ is therefore to reject God's grace and forgiveness, to refuse 
the one means of salvation which God has provided. It is to remain under His 
condemnation and wrath, to forfeit eternally salvation. For someday God will 
judge all men, "inflicting vengeance upon those who do not know God and upon 
those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus. They shall suffer the 
punishment of eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord 
and from the glory of his might" (II Thessalonians 1.8-9). 
It was not just Paul who held to this exclusivistic, Christocentric view of 
salvation. No less than Paul, the apostle John saw no salvation outside of Christ. 
In his gospel, Jesus declares, "( am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one 
comes to the Father, but by me" (John 14.6). John explains that men love the 
darkness of sin rather than light, but that God has sent His Son into the world 
to save the world and to give eternal life to everyone who believes in the Son. 
"He who believes is not condemned; he who does not believe is condemned 
already, because he has not believed in the name of the only Son of God" (John 
3.18). People are already spiritually dead; but those who believe in Christ pass 
from death to life (John 5.24). In his epistles, John asserts that no one who 
denies the Son has the Father and identifies such a person as the antichrist (I 
John 2.22-23; 4.3; II John 9). In short, "He who has the Son has life; he who 
has not the Son of God has not life" (I John 5.12). In John's Apocalypse, it is 
the Lamb alone in heaven and on earth and under the earth who is worthy to 
open the scroIl and its seven seals, for it was he that by his blood ransomed men 
for God from every tribe and tongue and people and nation on the earth (Revelation 
5.1-14). In the consummation, everyone whose name is not found written in the 
Lamb's book of life is cast into the everlasting fire reserved for the devil and 
his cohorts (Revelation 20.15). 
One could make the same point from the catholic epistles and the pastorals. 
It is the conviction of the writers of the New Testament that "there is one God, 
and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who 
gave himself as a ransom for all'' (I Timothy 2.5-6). 
Indeed, it is plausible that such was the attitude of Jesus himself. New Testa-
ment scholarship has reached something of a consensus that the historical Jesus 
came on the scene with an unparalleled sense of divine authority, the authority 
to stand and speak in the place of God Himself and to call men to repentance 
and faith. I Moreover, the object of that faith was he himself, the absolute reve-
lation of God: "AIl things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one 
knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son 
and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matthew 11.27).2 On the 
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day of judgment, people's destiny will be determined by how they responded 
to him: "And I tell you, everyone who acknowledges me before men, the Son 
of Man also will acknowledge before the angels of God; but he who denies me 
before men will be denied before the angels of God" (Luke 12.8-9).' Frequent 
warnings concerning hell are found on Jesus's lips, and it may well be that he 
believed that most of mankind would be damned, while a minority of mankind 
would be saved: "Enter by the narrow gate, for the gate is wide and the way is 
easy, that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate 
is narrow and the way is hard, that leads to life, and those who find it are few" 
(Matthew 7:l3-14): 
A hard teaching, no doubt; but the logic of the New Testament is simple and 
compelling: the universality of sin and the uniqueness Christ's expiatory sacrifice 
entail that there is no salvation apart from Christ. Although this exclusivity was 
scandalous in the polytheistic world of the first century, with the triumph of 
Christianity throughout the Empire the scandal receded. Indeed, one of the classic 
marks of the church was its catholicity, and for men like Augustine and Aquinas 
the universality of the church was one of the signs that the Scriptures are divine 
revelation, since so great a structure could not have been generated by and 
founded upon a falsehood. 5 Of course, recalcitrant Jews remained in Christian 
Europe, and later the infidel armies of Islam had to be combatted, but these 
exceptions were hardly sufficient to overturn the catholicity of the church or to 
promote religious pluralism. 
But with the so-called "Expansion of Europe" during the three centuries of 
exploration and discovery from 1450 to 1750, the situation changed radically. 6 
It was now seen that far from being the universal religion, Christianity was 
confined to a small corner of the globe. This realization had a two-fold impact 
upon people's religious thinking: (i) it tended toward the relativization of religious 
beliefs. Since each religious system was historically and geographically limited, 
it seemed incredible that any of them should be regarded as universally true. It 
seemed that the only religion which could make a universal claim upon mankind 
would be a sort of general religion of nature. (ii) It tended to make Christianity's 
claim to exclusivity appear unjustly narrow and cruel. If salvation was only 
through faith in Christ, then the majority of the human race was condemned to 
eternal damnation, since they had not so much as even heard of Christ. Again, 
only a natural religion available to all men seemed consistent with a fair and 
loving God. 
In our own day the influx into Western nations of immigrants from former 
colonies, coupled with the advances in telecommunications which have served 
to shrink the world toward a "global village," have heightened both of these 
impressions. As a result, the church has to a great extent lost its sense of 
missionary calling or been forced to reinterpret it in terms of social engagement, 
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while those who continue to adhere to the traditional, orthodox view are 
denounced for religious intolerance. This shift is perhaps best illustrated by the 
attitude of the Second Vatican Council toward world mission. In its Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Church, the Council declared that those who have not yet 
received the gospel are related in various ways to the people of God. 7 Jews, in 
particular, remain dear to God, but the plan of salvation also includes all who 
acknowledge the Creator, such as Muslims. People who through no fault of their 
own do not know the gospel, but who strive to do God's will by conscience can 
also be saved. The Council therefore declared that Catholics now pray for the 
Jews, not for the conversion of the Jews and also declares that the Church looks 
with esteem upon Muslims. 8 Missionary work seems to be directed only toward 
those who "serve the creature rather than the Creator" or are utterly hopeless. 9 
Carefully couched in ambiguous language and often apparently internally incon-
sistent,1O the documents of Vatican II could easily be taken as a radical reinterpre-
tation of the nature of the Church and of Christian missions, according to which 
great numbers of non-Christians are salvificaHy related to the Church and therefore 
not appropriate subjects of evangelism. 
The difficulty of the orthodox position has compelled some persons to embrace 
universalism and as a consequence to deny the incarnation of Christ. Thus, John 
Hick explains, 
For understood literally the Son of God, God the Son, God-incarnate 
language implies that God can be adequately known and responded to 
only through Jesus; and the whole religious life of mankind, beyond 
the stream of Judaic-Christian faith is thus by implication excluded as 
lying outside the sphere of salvation. This implication did little positive 
harm so long as Christendom was a largely autonomous civilization 
with only relatively marginal interaction with the rest of mankind. But 
with the clash between the Christian and Muslim worlds, and then on 
an ever broadening front with European colonization through the earth, 
the literal understanding of the mythological language of Christian dis-
cipleship has had a divisive effect upon the relations between that 
minority of human beings who live within the borders of the Christian 
tradition and that majority who live outside it and within other streams 
of religious life. 
Transposed into theological terms, the problem which has come to 
the surface in the encounter of Christianity with the other world religions 
is this: If Jesus was literally God incarnate, and if it is by his death 
alone that men can be saved, and by their response to him alone that 
they can appropriate that salvation, then the only doorway to eternal 
life is Christian faith. It would follow from this that the large majority 
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of the human race so far have not been saved. But is it credible that 
the loving God and Father of all men has decreed that only those born 
within one particular thread of human history shall be saved ?II 
But what exactly is the problem with God's condemning persons who adhere 
to non-Christian religions? I do not see that the very notion of hell is incompatible 
with a just and loving God. According to the New Testament, God does not 
want anyone to perish, but desires that all persons repent and be saved and come 
to know the truth (II Peter 3.9; I Timothy 2.4). He therefore seeks to draw all 
men to Himself. Those who make a well-informed and free decision to reject 
Christ are self-condemned, since they repudiate God's unique sacrifice for sin. 
By spuming God's prevenient grace and the solicitation of His Spirit, they shut 
out God's mercy and seal their own destiny. They, therefore, and not God, are 
responsible for their condemnation, and God deeply mourns their loss. 
Nor does it seem to me that the problem can be simply reduced to the incon-
sistency of a loving and just God's condemning persons who are either un-, ill-, 
or misinformed concerning Christ and who therefore lack the opportunity to 
receive Him. For one could maintain that God graciously applies to such persons 
the benefits of Christ's atoning death without their conscious knowledge thereof 
on the basis of their response to the light of general revelation and the truth that 
they do have, even as He did in the case of Old Testament figures like Job who 
were outside the covenant of Israel. 12 The testimony of Scripture is that the mass 
of humanity do not even respond to the light that they do have, and God's 
condemnation of them is neither unloving nor unjust, since He judges them 
according to standards of general revelation vastly lower than those which are 
applied to persons who have been recipients of His special revelation. 
Rather the real problem, it seems to me, involves certain counterfactuals of 
freedom concerning those who do not receive special revelation and so are lost. 
If we take Scripture seriously, we must admit that the vast majority of persons 
in the world are condemned and will be forever lost, even if in some relatively 
rare cases a person might be saved through his response to the light that he has 
apart from special revelation. 13 But then certain questions inevitably arise: Why 
did God not supply special revelation to persons who, while rejecting the general 
revelation they do have, would have responded to the gospel of Christ if they 
had been sufficiently well-informed concerning it? More fundamentally, Why 
did God create this world when He knew that so many persons would not receive 
Christ and would therefore be lost? Even more radically, why did God not create 
a world in which everyone freely receives Christ and so is saved? 
Now all of these questions appear, at least, to presuppose that certain counter-
factuals of freedom concerning people's response to God's gracious initiatives 
are true, and the last two seem to presuppose that God's omniscience embraces 
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a species of knowledge known as middle knowledge (scientia media). For if 
there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, it is not true that certain persons 
would receive Christ if they were to hear the gospel, nor can God be held 
responsible for the number of the lost if He lacks middle knowledge, for without 
such knowledge He could only guess in the moment logically prior to His decree 
to create the world how many and, indeed, whether any persons would freely 
receive Christ (or whether He would even send Christ!) and be saved. Let us 
assume, then, that some such counterfactuals are true and that God has middle 
knowledge. 14 
For those who are unfamiliar with this species of knowledge and as considerable 
confusion exists concerning it, a few words about the concept of middle knowl-
edge and its implications for providence and predestination might be helpful. 
Scientia Media 
Largely the product of the creative genius of the Spanish Jesuit of the Counter-
Reformation Luis Molina (1535-1600), the doctrine of middle knowledge proposes 
to furnish an analysis of divine knowledge in terms of three logical moments. 15 
Although whatever God knows, He has known from eternity, so that there is no 
temporal succession in God's knowledge, nonetheless there does exist a sort oflogi-
cal succession in God's knowledge in that His knowledge of certain propositions 
is conditionally or explanatorily prior to His knowledge of certain other propo-
sitions. That is to say, God's knowledge of a particular set of propositions depends 
asymmetrically on His knowledge of a certain other set of propositions and is 
in this sense posterior to it. In the first, unconditioned moment God knows all 
possibilia, not only all individual essences, but also all possible worlds. Molina 
calls such knowledge "natural knowledge" because the content of such knowledge 
is essential to God and in no way depends on the free decisions of His will. By 
means of His natural knowledge, then, God has knowledge of every contingent 
state of affairs which could possibly obtain and of what the exemplification of the 
individual essence of any free creature could freely choose to do in any such state 
of affairs that should be actual. 
In the second moment, God possesses knowledge of all true counterfactual 
propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is to say, He 
knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states 
of affairs were to obtain; whereas by His natural knowledge God knew what 
any free creature could do in any set of circumstances, now in this second 
moment God knows what any free creature would do in any set of circumstances. 
This is not because the circumstances causally determine the creature's choice, 
but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose. God thus knows 
that were He to actualize certain states of affairs, then certain other contingent 
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states of affairs would obtain. Molina calls this counterfactual knowledge "middle 
knowledge" because it stands in between the first and third moment in divine 
knowledge. Middle knowledge is like natural knowledge in that such knowledge 
does not depend on any decision of the divine will; God does not determine 
which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true or false. Thus, if it is true that 
If some agent S were placed in circumstances C, then he would freely 
perform action a, 
then even God in His omnipotence cannot bring it about that S would refrain 
from a if he were placed in C. On the other hand, middle knowledge is unlike 
natural knowledge in that the content of His middle knowledge is not essential 
to God. True counterfactuals of freedom are contingently true; S could freely 
decide to refrain from a in C, so that different counterfactuals could be true and 
be known by God than those that are. Hence, although it is essential to God that 
He have middle knowledge, it is not essential to Him to have middle knowledge 
of those particular propositions which He does in fact know. 
Intervening between the second and third moments of divine knowledge stands 
God's free decree to actualize a world known by Him to be realizable on the 
basis of His middle knowledge. By His natural knowledge, God knows what is 
the entire range of logically possible worlds; by His middle knowledge He knows, 
in effect, what is the proper subset of those worlds which it is feasible for Him 
to actualize. By a free decision, God decrees to actualize one of those worlds 
known to Him through His middle knowledge. According to Molina, this decision 
is the result of a complete and unlimited deliberation by means of which God 
considers and weighs every possible circumstance and its ramifications and 
decides to settle on the particular world He desires. Hence, logically prior, if 
not chronologicaIIy prior, to God's creation of the world is the divine deliberation 
concerning which world to actualize. 
Given God's free decision to actualize a world, in the third and final moment 
God possesses knowledge of all remaining propositions that are in fact true in 
the actual world. Such knowledge is denominated "free knowledge" by Molina 
because it is logically posterior to the decision of the divine will to actualize a 
world. The content of such knowledge is clearly not essential to God, since He 
could have decreed to actualize a different world. Had He done so, the content 
of His free knowledge would be different. 
Molina saw clearly the profound implications a doctrine of middle knowledge 
could have for the notions of providence and predestination. God's providence 
is His ordering of things to their ends, either directly or mediately through 
secondary agents. Molina distinguishes between God's absolute and conditional 
intentions for creatures. It is, for example, God's absolute intention that no 
creature should sin and that all should reach beatitude. But it is not within the 
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scope of God's power to control what free creatures would do if placed in any 
set of circumstances. In certain circumstances, then, creatures would freely sin, 
despite the fact that God does not will this. Should God then choose to actualize 
precisely those circumstances, He has no choice but to aIlow the creature to sin. 
God's absolute intentions can thus be frustrated by free creatures. But God's 
conditional intentions, which are based on His middle knowledge and thus take 
account of what free creatures would do, cannot be so frustrated. It is God's 
conditional intention to permit many actions on the part of free creatures which 
He does not absolutely will; but in His infinite wisdom God so orders which 
states of affairs obtain that His purposes are achieved despite and even through 
the sinful, free choices of creatures. God thus providentially arranges for every-
thing that does happen by either willing or permitting it, and He causes everything 
to happen insofar as He concurs with the decisions of free creatures in producing 
their effects, yet He does so in such a way as to preserve freedom and contingency. 
Middle knowledge also serves to reconcile predestination and human freedom. 
On Molina's view predestination is merely that aspect of providence pertaining 
to eternal salvation; it is the order and means by which God ensures that some 
free creature attains eternal life. Prior to the divine decree, God knows via His 
middle knowledge how any possible free creature would respond in any possible 
circumstances, which include the offer of certain gifts of prevenient grace which 
God might provide. In choosing a certain possible world, God commits Himself, 
out of His goodness, to offering various gifts of grace to every person which 
are sufficient for his salvation. Such grace is not intrinsically efficacious in that 
it of itself produces its effect; rather it is extrinsically efficacious in accomplishing 
its end in those who freely cooperate with it. God knows that many wiIl freely 
reject His sufficient grace and be lost; but He knows that many others wiII assent 
to it, thereby rendering it efficacious in effecting their salvation. Given God's 
immutable decree to actualize a certain world, those whom God knew would 
respond to His grace are predestined to do so in the sense that it is absolutely 
certain that they will respond to and persevere in God's grace. There is no risk 
of their being lost; indeed, in sensu composito it is impossible for them to fall 
away. But in sensu diviso they are entirely free to reject God's grace; but were 
they to do so, God would have had different middle knowledge and they would 
not have been predestined. '6 Similarly those who are not predestined have no 
one to blame but themselves. It is up to God whether we find ourselves in a 
world in which we are predestined, but it is up to us whether we are predestined 
in the world in which we find ourselves. 
The Soteriological Problem of Evil 
Years ago when I first read Alvin Plantinga's basically Molinist formulation 
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of the Free Will Defense against the problem of evil, it occurred to me that his 
reasoning might also help to resolve the problem of the exclusivity of salvation 
through Christ, and my own subsequent study of the notion of middle knowledge 
has convinced me that this is in fact SO.17 For the person who objects to the 
exclusivity of salvation through Christ is, in effect, posing what one might call 
the soteriological problem of evil, that is to say, he maintains that the proposition 
1. God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent 
is inconsistent with 
2. Some persons do not receive Christ and are damned. 
Since (1) is essential to theism, we must therefore deny (2). 
The orthodox Christian will point out, however, that (I) and (2) are not 
explicitly contradictory, since one is not the negation of the other, nor are they 
logically contradictory, since a contradiction cannot be derived from them using 
first order logic. The objector, then, must mean that (I) and (2) are inconsistent 
in the broadly logical sense, that is, that there is no possible world in which 
both are true. Now in order to show this, the objector must supply some further 
premise(s) which meets the following conditions: (i) its conjunction with 0) and 
(2) formally entails a contradiction, (ii) it is either necessarily true, essential to 
theism, or a logical consequence of propositions that are, and (iii) its meeting 
conditions (i) and (ii) could not be rationally denied by a right-thinking person. 18 
I am not aware of anyone who has tried to supply the missing premise which 
meets these conditions, but let us try to find some such proposition. Perhaps it 
might be claimed that the following two propositions will suffice: 
3. God is able to actualize a possible world in which all persons freely 
receive Christ. 
4. God prefers a world in which no persons fail to receive Christ and 
are damned to a world in which some do. 
It might be claimed that anyone who accepts (1) must also accept (3) and (4), 
since (3) is true in virtue of God's omniscience (which includes middle knowl-
edge) and His omnipotence, and (4) is true in virtue of His omnibenevolence. 
But is (3) necessarily true or incumbent upon the theist who is a Molinist? 
This is far from clear. For although it is logically possible that God actualize 
any possible world (assuming that God exists in every possible world), it does 
not follow therefrom that it is feasible for God to actualize any possible world. 19 
For God's ability to actualize worlds containing free creatures will be limited 
by which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true in the moment logically 
prior to the divine decree. In a world containing free creatures, God can strongly 
actualize only certain segments or states of affairs in that world, and the remainder 
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He must weakly actualize, using His middle knowledge of what free creatures 
would do under any circumstances. Hence, there will be an infinite number of 
possible worlds known to God by His natural knowledge which are not realizable 
by Him because the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which must be true 
in order for Him to weakly actualize such worlds are in fact false. 20 His middle 
knowledge serves to delimit, so to speak, the range of logically possible worlds 
to those which are feasible for Him to actualize. This might be thought to impugn 
divine omnipotence, but in fact such a restriction poses no non-logical limit to 
God's power. 2 ! 
So the question is whether it is necessarily true or incumbent upon the Molinist 
to hold that within the range of possible worlds which are feasible to God there 
is at least one world in which everyone freely receives Christ and is saved. Now 
within Molinism there is a school known as Congruism which would appear to 
agree that such a position is mandatory for the theist. 22 According to Suarez, for 
any individual God might create there are gifts of prevenient grace which would 
be efficacious in winning the free consent of that individual to God's offer of 
salvation. 23 Such grace, which Suarez calls "congruent grace" (gratia congrua), 
consists in the divine gifts and aids which would be efficacious in eliciting the 
response desired by God, but without coercion. No grace is intrinsically effica-
cious, but congruent grace is always in fact efficacious because God knows via 
His middle knowledge that the creature would freely and affirmatively respond 
to it, were He to offer it. Accordingly, the Congruist might claim 
5. God knows for any individual S under what circumstances S would 
freely receive Christ. 
But why is it incumbent upon us to accept (5)? Given that persons are free, 
might there not be persons who would not receive Christ in any actual world in 
which they existed? Suarez himself seemed to vacillate at this point. When asked 
whether there is a congruent grace for every person God could create or whether 
some persons are so incorrigible that regardless of the grace accorded them by 
God, they would not repent, Suarez wants to say that God can win the free 
response of any creature He could create. But when pressed that it is logically 
possible that some person should resist every grace, Suarez concedes that this 
is true, but adds that God could still save such a person by overpowering his 
will. 24 But such coercive salvation is beside the point; so long as there might be 
individuals for whom no grace would be congruent, (5) cannot be regarded as 
necessary or essential to theism. On the contrary, the theist might hold that 
6. For some individual S, there are no circumstances under which S 
would freely receive Christ. 
In such a case, the theist could consistently maintain that there are no worlds 
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feasible for God in which 5 exists and is saved. 
The Congruist could, however, accept (6) and still insist that there are congruent 
graces for many other individuals and that God could actualize a world containing 
only such individuals, so that everyone would receive Christ and be saved. But 
the Congruist must show more than that for certain (or even every) individual 
there are circumstances under which that person would freely receive Christ. He 
must show that the circumstances under which various individuals would freely 
receive Christ are compossible, so that all persons in some possible world would 
freely receive Christ and be saved. It is not even enough to show that the various 
circumstances are compossible; if he is to avoid the counterfactual fallacy of 
strengthening the antecedent, he must show that in the combined circumstances 
the consequent still follows. It might be that in circumstances C l' individual 51 
would do action a and that in circumstances C2 individual 52 would do band 
that C J and C2 are compossible, but it does not follow that in C J • Cz, 5 J would 
do a or that in C J • C2 , 52 would do b. Hence, even if it were the case that for 
any individual He might create, God could actualize a world in which that person 
is freely saved, it does not follow that there are worlds which are feasible for 
God in which all individuals are saved. Contrary to (3) the theist might hold that 
7. There is no world feasible for God in which all persons would freely 
receive Christ. 
Unless we have good reason to think that (7) is impossible or essentially incom-
patible with Christian theism, the objector has failed to show (1) and (2) to be 
inconsistent. 
That leads to (4), which, it is said, is incumbent upon anyone who accepts 
God's omnibenevolence. Now I think that it is obvious that, all things being 
equal, an omnibenevolent God prefers a world in which all persons are saved 
to a world containing those same persons some of whom are lost. But (4) is 
stronger than this. It claims that God prefers any world in which all persons are 
saved to any world in which some persons are damned. But again, this is far 
from obvious. Suppose that the only worlds feasible for God in which all persons 
receive Christ and are saved are worlds containing only a handful of persons. 
Is it not at least possible that such a world is less preferable to God than a world 
in which great multitudes come to experience His salvation and a few are damned 
because they freely reject Christ? Not only does this seem to me possibly true, 
but I think that it probably is true. Why should the joy and blessedness of those 
who would receive God's grace and love be prevented on account of those who 
would freely spurn it? An omnibenevolent God might want as many creatures 
as possible to share salvation; but given certain true counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom, God, in order to have a multitude in heaven, might have to accept a 
number in hell. Hence, contrary to (4) the theist might well hold that 
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8. God prefers certain worlds in which some persons fail to receive 
Christ and are damned to certain worlds in which all receive Christ and 
are saved. 
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So unless we have good reason to think that (8) is impossible or essentially 
incompatible with Christian theism, the objector has again failed to show (I) 
and (2) to be inconsistent. 
Since we have no good grounds for believing (3) and (4) to be necessary or 
essential to theism, or for that matter even contingently true, the opponent of 
the traditional Christian view has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is 
no possible world in which God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent 
and yet in which some persons do not receive Christ and are damned. 
But, on the pattern of the Free Will Defense, we can yet go further. For I 
believe that we can demonstrate not only that (1) and (2) have not been shown 
to be inconsistent, but also that they are, indeed, consistent. In order to show 
(I) and (2) to be consistent, the orthodox defender has to come up with a 
proposition which is consistent with (1) and which together with (I) entails (2). 
This proposition need not be plausible or even true; it need be only a possibly 
true proposition, even if it is contingently false. 
Now we have seen that it is possible that God wants to maximize the number 
of the saved: He wants heaven to be as full as possible. Moreover, as a loving 
God, He wants to minimize the number of the lost: He wants hell to be as empty 
as possible. His goal, then, is to achieve an optimal balance between these, to 
create no more lost than is necessary to achieve a certain number ofthe saved. 
But it is possible that the balance between saved and lost in the actual world 
is such an optimal balance. It is possible that in order to create the actual number 
of persons who will be saved, God had to create the actual number of persons 
who will be lost. It is possible that the terrible price of filling heaven is also 
filling hell and that in any other possible world which was feasible for God the 
balance between saved and lost was worse. It is possible that had God actualized 
a world in which there are less persons in hell, there would also have been less 
persons in heaven. It is possible that in order to achieve this much blessedness, 
God was forced to accept this much loss. Even if we grant that God could have 
achieved a better ratio between saved and lost, it is possible that in order to 
achieve such a ratio God would have had to so drastically reduce the number of 
the saved as to leave heaven deficient in population (say, by creating a world 
of only four people, three of whom go to heaven and one to hell). It is possible 
that in order to achieve a multitude of saints, God had to accept an even greater 
multitude of sinners. 
It might be objected that necessarily a loving God would not create persons 
who He knew would be damned as a concomitant of His creating persons who 
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He knew would be saved. Given His middle knowledge of such a prospect, He 
should have refrained from creation altogether. But this objection does not strike 
me as true, much less necessarily so. It is possible that God loves all persons 
and desires their salvation and furnishes sufficient grace for the salvation of all; 
indeed, some of the lost may receive even greater gifts of prevenient grace than 
some of the saved. It is of their own free will that people reject the grace of 
God and are damned. Their damnation is the result of their own choice and is 
contrary to God's perfect will, which is that all persons be saved, and their 
previsioned obduracy should not be allowed to preclude God's creating persons 
who would freely respond to His grace and be saved. 
But it might be further objected that necessarily a loving God would not create 
persons who would be damned as a concomitant of His creating persons who 
would be saved if He knew that the former would under other circumstances 
have freely responded to His grace and been saved. Therefore, He should not 
have created at all. Now one might respond by denying the necessary truth of 
such a proposition; one could argue that so long as people receive sufficient 
grace for salvation in whatever circumstances they are, then they are responsible 
for their response in such circumstances and cannot complain that had they been 
in different circumstances, then their reaction would have been different. But 
even if we concede that the objector's principle is necessarily true, how do we 
know that its antecedent is fulfilled? We have seen that it is possible that some 
persons would not freely receive Christ under any circumstances. Suppose, then, 
that God has so ordered the world that all persons who are actually lost are such 
persons. In such a case, anyone who actually is lost would have been lost in 
any world in which God had created him. It is possible, then, that although God, 
in order to bring this many persons to salvation, had to pay the price of seeing 
this many persons lost, nevertheless He has providentially ordered the world 
such that those who are lost are persons who would not have been saved in any 
world feasible for God in which they exist. On the analogy of transworld deprav-
ity,25 we may accordingly speak of the property of transworld damnation, which 
is possessed by any person who freely does not respond to God's grace and so 
is lost in every world feasible for God in which that person exists (this notion 
can, of course, be more accurately restated in terms of individual essences and 
instantiations thereof). 
Therefore, we are now prepared to furnish a proposition which is consistent 
with (l) and entails (2): 
9. God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between 
saved and unsaved, and those who are unsaved suffer from transworld 
damnation. 
So long as (9) is even possible, one is consistent in believing both (1) and (2). 
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On the basis of this analysis, we now seem to be equipped to provide possible 
answers to the three difficult questions which prompted our inquiry. (i) Why did 
God not create a world in which everyone freely receives Christ and so is saved? 
There is no such world which is feasible for God. He would have actualized 
such a world were this feasible, but in light of certain true counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom every world realizable by God is a world in which some 
persons are lost. Given His will to create a world of free creatures, God must 
accept that some will be lost. (ii) Why did God create this world when He knew 
that so many persons would not receive Christ and would therefore be lost? God 
desired to incorporate as many persons as He could into the love and joy of 
divine fellowship while minimizing the number of persons whose final state is 
hell. He therefore chose a world having an optimal balance between the number 
of the saved and the number of the damned. Given the truth of certain counter-
factuals of creaturely freedom, it was not feasible for God to actualize a world 
having as many saved as but with no more damned than the actual world. The 
happiness of the saved should not be precluded by the admittedly tragic cir-
cumstance that their salvation has as its concomitant the damnation of many 
others, for the fate of the damned is the result of their own free choice. (iii) 
Why did God not supply special revelation to persons who, while rejecting the 
general revelation they do have, would have responded to the gospel of Christ 
if they had been sufficiently well-informed concerning it? There are no such 
persons. In each world in which they exist God loves and wills the salvation of 
persons who in the actual world have only general revelation, and He graciously 
and preveniently solicits their response by His Holy Spirit, but in every world 
feasible for God they freely reject His grace and are lost. If there were anyone 
who would have responded to the gospel if he had heard it, then God in His 
love would have brought the gospel to such a person. Apart from miraculous 
intervention, "a single revelation to the whole earth has never in the past been 
possible, given the facts of geography and technology"/6 but God in His provi-
dence has so arranged the world that as the gospel spread outward from its 
historical roots in first century Palestine, all who would respond to this gospel, 
were they to hear it, did and do hear it. Those who have only general revelation 
and do not respond to it would also not have responded to the gospel had they 
heard it. Hence, no one is lost because of lack of information due to historical 
or geographical accident. All who want or would want to be saved will be saved. 
The above are only possible answers to the questions posed. We have been 
about a defense, not a theodicy, concerning the soteriological problem of evil. 
What I have shown is that the orthodox Christian is not inconsistent in affirming 
that an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God exists and that some 
people do not receive Christ and are damned. It might, of course, be countered 
that while the possibility of (9) shows the orthodox position to be consistent, 
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still (9) is highly improbable, given the world in which we live, so that (2) still 
remains improbable. if not inconsistent, with regard to (1). But here the strength 
of the position I have been defending emerges beyond that of Plantinga's Free 
Will Defense. For while it seems fantastic to attribute all natural evil to the 
actions of demonic beings (e. g. , earthquakes' being caused by the demons pushing 
about tectonic plates), (9) does not seem similarly implausible. On the contrary. 
I find the above account of the matter to be quite plausible not only as a defense, 
but also as a soteriological theodicy. Indeed, I think that it helps to put the proper 
perspective on Christian missions: it is our duty to proclaim the gospel to the 
whole world, trusting that God has so providentially ordered things that through 
us the good news will be brought to persons who God knew would respond if 
they heard it. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, then, I think that a middle knowledge perspective on the problem 
of the exclusivity of the Christian religion can be quite fruitful. Since all persons 
are in sin, all are in need of salvation. Since Christ is God's unique expiatory 
sacrifice for sin. salvation is only through Christ. Since Jesus and his work are 
historical in character. many persons as a result of historical and geographical 
accident will not be sufficiently well-informed concerning him and thus unable 
to respond to him in faith. Such persons who are not sufficiently well-informed 
about Christ's person and work will be judged on the basis of their response to 
general revelation and the light that they do have. Perhaps some will be saved 
through such a response; but on the basis of Scripture we must say that such 
"anonymous Christians" are relatively rare. Those who are judged and condemned 
on the basis of their failure to respond to the light of general revelation cannot 
legitimately complain of unfairness for their not also receiving the light of special 
revelation, since such persons would not have responded to special revelation 
had they received it. For God in His providence has so arranged the world that 
anyone who would receive Christ has the opportunity to do so. Since God loves 
all persons and desires the salvation of all, He supplies sufficient grace for 
salvation to every individual, and nobody who would receive Christ if he were 
to hear the gospel will be denied that opportunity. As Molina puts it, our salvation 
is in our own hands. 
Finally, I hope that no reader has been offended by what might appear to be 
a rather arid and dispassionate discussion of the salvation and damnation of 
people apart from Christ. But with such an emotionally explosive issue on the 
table, it seems to me that it is prudent to treat it with reserve. No orthodox 
Christian likes the doctrine of hell or delights in anyone' s condemnation. I truly 
wish that universalism were true, but it is not. My compassion toward those in 
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other world religions is therefore expressed, not in pretending that they are not lost 
and dying without Christ, but by my supporting and making every effort myself to 
communicate to them the life-giving message of salvation through Christ. 27 
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